Modeling of the decision-making procedure for financing of cyber security means of cloud services by the medium of a bilinear multistep quality game with several terminal surfaces by Lakhno, Valery et al.
INTL JOURNAL OF ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 2018, VOL. 64, NO. 4, PP. 467–472
Manuscript received March 21, 2018; revised October, 2018. DOI: 10.24425/123547
Modeling of the Decision-making Procedure for
Financing of Cyber Security Means of Cloud
Services by the Medium of a Bilinear Multistep
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Abstract—The model is developed for the intellectualized
decision-making support system on financing of cyber security
means of transport cloud-based computing infrastructures, given
the limited financial resources. The model is based on the use of
the theory of multistep games tools. The decision, which gives
specialists a chance to effectively assess risks in the financing
processes of cyber security means, is found. The model differs
from the existing approaches in the decision of bilinear multistep
quality games with several terminal surfaces. The decision of
bilinear multistep quality games with dependent movements is
found. On the basis of the decision for a one-step game, founded
by application of the domination method and developed for
infinite antagonistic games, the conclusion about risks for players
is drawn. The results of a simulation experiment within program
implementation of the intellectualized decision-making support
system in the field of financing of cyber security means of cloud-
based computing infrastructures on transport are described. Con-
firmed during the simulation experiment, the decision assumes
accounting a financial component of cyber defense strategy at
any ratios of the parameters, describing financing process.
Keywords—cloud infrastructures, cyber security, multistep
quality game, optimum financing strategy, risks, decision-making
support system
I. INTRODUCTION
CLOUD infrastructures are subject to the same risks andthreats, as traditional networked ones.
Owing to rapid development of information and com-
munication technologies on different types of transport and
increasing data volume, many transport companies began to
increasingly transfer their information and calculations to
clouds [1]. At the same time, in [2, 3] it is noted that the cloud
platforms of hosting providers became an attractive target
for cybermalefactors. For example, disclosure of personal
user information, a trade secret and other data in a cloud,
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can potentially lead to severe financial and reputation losses
for hosting providers. Therefore, service providers of cloud-
based computing and data storage try to provide the due
level of cyber defense to minimize risks and cyberthreats. If
ensuring physical security is based on strict control of access
to infrastructure components, the network safety still remains
a problem section in perimeters of cyber defense of cloud
infrastructure for many intellectual transport systems (ITS). In
particular, one of the ways to enhance efficiency for the ITS
is a better interaction with services on the wide area network,
for example, with services of electronic cards and satellite
pictures, access to the electronic schedule, etc. is. Under the
conditions of more sophisticated cyber attacks to transport
cloud infrastructures, one of the major tasks, facing operation
services, is an issue of ensuring their cyber defense. It, in turn,
leads to the necessity of financial investment into the cyber
security systems (CSS) of cloud infrastructures on transport
(CIST). One of the drawbacks of the previous research is the
fact that authors generally investigated numerical values of
metrics for expected losses, when modeling risks of cyber
security. One of the options to tackle these issues and, in
particular, to assess the risks, connected with financing of
CIST CSS, is introduction of the intellectualized decision-
making support systems (IDMSS) [4]. Similar systems allow
to make rational decisions on investing in the CIST protection
tools development. It should be noticed that the mathematical
aspect of the IDMSS in cyber security issues [5, 6] is expressed
in different models and algorithms, giving the specialists a
chance to intellectualize the support of decision-making. In
the article the model for IDMSS, according to the discrete
procedure of the CIST CSS financing, is offered. The model
is based on the decision of a bilinear multistep quality game
with two terminal surfaces.
II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Application of the CIST and ITS requires the innovative ap-
proaches to cyber security management. The multistep quality
game with two terminal surfaces is considered in this research
[7]. It includes player 1 (U)− a cyberdefender (further the
CIST and ITS defender, for instance); player 2 (U)− a male-
factor (hacker). Players 1 and 2 manage a dynamic system. The
system is set by the system of the bilinear discrete equations
with dependent movements. As the players are supposed to
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finance the CSS and the means to overcome boundaries of the
CIST and ITS cyber defense respectively, it is necessary to
find a number of strategies they employ. Two terminal surfaces
M0, N0 are also set. The purpose of the defender is to bring the
dynamic system onto the terminal surface M0 by means of his
management strategies. It is accepted that the hackers financial
strategy is arbitrary. The purpose of the hacker to bring the
dynamic system onto the terminal surface N0 by means of his
management strategies, whatever are the defenders actions. In
the course of the decision-making it is necessary to find the
varieties of starting states of the objects and their strategies,
which allow them to bring the system onto one or another
surface [7]. If the time of interaction of the defender and
hacker is limited to one step, we receive the decision of a
one-step game in the class of mixed strategies. The decision
is made by means of domination methods for infinite multistep
games [8].
III. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
As it was noted in [1−3] virtually all companies, represented
in the cloud computing segment, including transport [4], are
forced to pay close attention to cyber defense of the cloud
infrastructure from cracking by malefactors. Various ”holes”
in cyber security are periodically found even in the large com-
panies. To the full extent it is referred to the objects of crucial
information infrastructure as well, in particular on transport
[1, 4]. It is obvious that CSS financing, including CIST, is a
permanent task. In the era of globalization and digitalization of
economies, the issue of CSS financing efficiency assessment
became one of the first priorities for cyber security services
and information protection. In the recent years alone, a large
number of publications is devoted to this area of research [3,
4, 6]. The main disadvantage of many works is the lack of
real recommendations on the financing strategy development
of cloud infrastructures CSS. In particular, it concerns a per-
spective of the modeling of active financial counteraction to an
attacking party. The works, devoted to application of different
expert solutions [5] and decision-making support systems [6,
9] for the choice of a CSS financing strategy, became an
original direction of publications in this area of research. A
lack of these research and as well as the models, offered by the
authors in the works [10-12] is the lack of unambiguous results
of modeling for the situations, in which financial resources of
the attacking party are not limited. It is worth noting that many
models, for instance, described in [1315], do not allow to find
the effective recommendations and CSS financing strategy of
complex informatization objects, in particular transport cloud
infrastructure. The results of research, presented in [13-15],
do not provide the party of cyber defense with a definite
answer to the question: how to develop the strategy, given the
attacking party has a financial resource, sufficient for cracking,
and the protection has not used its financial resource correctly.
It means the mistakes have taken place in the course of forming
an expenditure side of the budget on compatible effective
CSS. The considered models [14-17] do not allow assessing
the risk of financial resources loss by the defense party as
well. Ii is possible to eliminate this defect of the previous
research by different authors at the expense of application of
the theoretical methods of differential and multistep games
of quality with several terminal surfaces [7, 18, 19]. The
approaches, stated in the works [8, 9, 20], are inapplicable
for such differential and multistep games. The theoretical
methods of differential and multistep games of quality with
several terminal surfaces can be effectively implemented in the
intellectualized decision-making support systems [19]. It will
certainly increase the efficiency of forecast calculations for the
CSS financial losses risk assessment. Taking into account the
debatability of the provisions, stated in the works [7, 18, 19,
20], the issue of further development of models for the DMSS
in CSS financing tasks is still relevant, and first of all, for the
objects of critical information infrastructure, which transport
cloud infrastructures can certainly be referred to.
IV. MODELS AND METHODS
For the solution of the task, financial resources are required
for both players (the defender and the hacker). For example,
the hacker can purchase special software for cracking, bribe
personnel, resort to phishing or apply DoS/DDoS attacks
(other strategies are also possible [11-13]). We accept that for
the set time frame {1...T} (T - a natural number) the defender
has d (0) of allocated financial resources, whereas the hacker
has h (0). These resources predetermine a forecast, at the
timepoint , the value of the defender and the hackers financial
resources for achievement of the purposes. We note that for a
case of comparison of decisions of two games multistep and
one-step we will come into coincidence of sets of starting
states of financial resources of the defender and the hacker
with the following property. Property: a set of the players
preferences, proceeding from which he achieves the purpose
in steps, matches a set of starting states of financial resources,
from which he achieves the purpose in a single step, applying
the optimum mixed strategy at optimum counteraction by the
other player in the class of mixed strategies with a probability
1
T . The probability
1
T means a risk of the purpose achievement
by one player. And, on the other hand, for the other player it
means a risk of falling short of the purpose. In the language of
”finance” it is interpreted as a risk of financial resources loss
by either the defender or the hacker. At an initial timepoint the
player (the defender) multiplies a value d (0) by a coefficient
(rate of change, growth) a (t) and selects the value u (t) (
u (t) [0, 1]). The later defines a defenders resource share a (t)
×a (t), spent by him at a timepoint . Similarly, at a timepoint
the hacker multiplies a value h (t) by a coefficient (rate of
change, growth) β(t) and selects the value v (t) ( v (t) [0, 1]).
The later defines a hackers resource share β(t) × h (t), spent
by him for cracking the CIST at a timepoint t. Let r1 be the
efficiency of investing funds in CSS. In other words r1 is the
coefficient showing how much financial resources the hacker
will need to crack the CIST, which is to be protected by the
defender, spending a financial resource unit for this purpose.
Let r2 be the efficiency of investing funds in the means of
CIST cracking. In other words r2 is the coefficient showing
how much financial resources the defender will need to protect
the CIST, which is to be cracked by the hacker, spending a
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financial resource unit for this purpose. Proceeding from all
above mentioned, the defender and hackers financial resources
change dynamics is set by the following system of the discrete
equations:
d (t+ 1) = α(t)·d(t)−u(t)·α(t)·d(t)−r2·v(t)·β(t)·h(t) (1)
h (t+ 1) = β(t)·h(t)−v(t)·β(t)·h(t)−r1·u(t)·a(t)·d(t) (2)
Then at a timepoint t accomplishment of one of four
conditions is possible:
1)d(t) ≥ 0, h(t) < 0. If this condition is true, it implies
that the procedure of CSS financing is complete. At the
same time, the CIST hacker did not have enough financial
resources to overcome protection;
2)d(t) < 0, h(t) ≥ 0. If this condition is satisfied, then the
procedure of financing of CSS is complete. The CIST defender
did not have enough financial resources for protection.
3)d(t) < 0, h(t) < 0. If this condition is satisfied, then
the procedure of CSS financing is complete. However, the
defender of CIST and the hacker did not have enough
financial resources to achieve their purposes.
4)d(t) ≥ 0, h(t) ≥ 0. If the fourth condition is satisfied, then
the CIST CSS financing procedure is to be continued further.
The values d(t), h(t) show the CSS financing result at an
interval [0,T] Financing of the CIST CSS is considered in
our work within the scheme of a position multistep game
with the complete information [7, 8, 19]. Within this scheme,
the CIST CSS financing process generates two tasks: 1) from
the point of view of the first allied player; 2) from the point
of view of the second allied player [7, 8, 19]. Owing to
symmetry, we will be limited to consideration of the task
from the point of view of the first allied player. The second
task is being solved similarly. Let T be a set {0, 1..., T}
Definition. The strict strategy of the first allied player is a
function u : T · [0, 1] · [0, 1] → [0, 1], which puts the value
u(t, (d, h)) : 0 ≤ u(t, (d, h)) ≤ 1 . to the information status
(or position) (t, (d, h)) The strict strategy of the first allied
player is a function which puts the value u(t, (d, h)) to the
information status at a timepoint . This value determines
a financial resource share of the defender which he was
going to spend for the CSS at the moment t.There are no
assumptions concerning the opposing players awareness
(within the scheme of a position multistep game). It is
equivalent to assumption that the opposing player selects his
own managing influence on the basis of any information.
Having chosen a strategy in the task 1, we determine a set
of the first players ”preference” W1. Also W2 is a set of
such starting states (d(0), h(0)) of the defender and hackers
financial resources, which have the property, formulated
below. Property : for the starting states W1 there is the
defenders strategy which, for any implementations of the
hackers strategy, ”brings”, at one of timepoints t, a system
status (d(0), h(0)) to the one which satisfies the condition
(1). At the same time, the hacker has no strategy which can
”lead” to accomplishment of the conditions (2) or (3), at one
of the previous timepoints. The defenders strategy (financial
component) having the specified property is to be called
optimum. The solution of the task 1 consists in finding of
a set of the defenders preference and his optimum strategy.
The task from the point of view of the hacker is similarly
set. Owing to the symmetry of task setting, it is enough to be
limited to the solution of the task 1, as the solution of the task
2 is found in the same way. The solution of the task 1 is found
by means of tools of the theory of multistep quality games
with the complete information [79, 19]. These tools allow
finding the solution at any ratios of game parameters. The
solution, i.e. sets of ”preference” W1 and optimum strategies
u∗(., .) at all ratios of game parameters, is shown in the article.
Case a) α ≤ β.
W i1 = {(d(0), h(0)) : k(i− 1) · β · h(0) ≤ r1 · α · d(0)
≺ k(i− 2) · β · h(0)} , i = 1, .. (3)
u∗ = {u∗(0, (d, h)), ..., u∗(i− 1, (d, h))} ,
u∗(t, (d, h)) = {[1− (r2 · β · h)/(a · d)]} , for(d, h)R2+
(4)
d > r2 · β · h and is not provided otherwise;t = 0, 1, ..., i− 1
Where
k(i) = 1 + r1 · r2 − (r1 · α · β)/(β · k(i− 1)); k−1 = 0,
k0 = 1 + r1 · r2;
(5)
WI =
∞⋃
i=1
W iI (6)
The beam
r1 · 2a · d(0) =
{⌊
1 + r1 · r2 + ((1 + r1 · r2)2 − 4
·r1 · r2 · α/β)0.5
⌋
/2 · β · h(0)} (7)
will be a barrier [7]. The barrier is a case, when from the
statuses
(d(0), h(0)) : r1 · α · d(0) ≤ {[1 + r1 · r1+(
(1 + r1 · r1)2 − 4 · r1 · r2 · αβ
)0.5]
/2 · β · h(0)
}
(8)
the defender cannot achieve the purpose at some timepoint.
Case b) α  β, r1 · r2 ≥ 1. In this case a set of the defenders
preference W1 will be consolidation of a finite number of the
sets W i1 , i.e.(N + 2) sets,
where N : k(i)  r1 ·r2 · αβ , i = 0, ..., N−1; k(N) ≤ r1 ·r2 · αβ ,
W i1 = {(d(0), h(0) : k(i− 1) · β · h(0) ≤ r1 · α · d(0)
≺ k(i− 2) · β · h(0))} , i = 1, ..., N + 1; (9)
WN+21 = {(d(0), h(0) : r1 · r2 · β · h(0) ≤ r1 · α · d(0)
≺ k(N) · β · h(0))} .
(10)
The optimum financial strategy u∗ =
(u∗(0, (d, h)), ..., u∗(N + 1, (d, h))is to be found as follows:
u∗(0, (d, h)) =
{
0, for(x, y)R2+, a · d > r2 · β · h
}
,
and is not provided otherwise u∗(t, (d, h)) ={
[1− (r2 · β · h)/(α · d)] , for(d, h)R2+, α · d > r2 · β · h
}
,
and is not provided otherwise; t = 1, ..., N + 1
Case c) α  β, r1 ·r2 ≺ 1. In this case a set of the defenders
preference W1 will also be consolidation of a finite number of
the sets W i1 . i.e. (N+i(∗)+2) sets, where N : k(i)  αβ , i =
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0, ..., N−1; k(N) ≤ αβ ; i∗- the minimum integer non-negative
number provided by the inequality k(N) ·(β/α)i∗+1 ≺ r1 ·r2.
There after
W i1 = {(d(0), h(0) : k(i− 1) · β · h(0) ≤ r1 · α · d(0)
≺ k(i− 2) · β · h(0))} , i = 1, ..., N + 1 If i∗ = 0,
(11)
then
W i1 = {(d(0), h(0) : k(i− 1) · β · h(0) ≤ r1 · α · d(0)
≺ k(i− 2) · β · h(0))} , (12)
i = 1, ..., N + 1;WN+21 =
{
d(0), h(0) : r(1) · r(2) · β
·h(0) ≤ r(1) · α · d(0) ≺ k(N) · β · h(0)
}
.
(13)
The optimum strategy listing in this case is just the same as
in the case b). If i∗ > 0, then
WN+1+i1 =
{
(d(0), h(0) : k(N) · (β
α
)j · β · h(0) ≤
r1 · α · d(0) ≺ k(N) · (βα )j−1 · β · h(0))
}
,
(14)
i = 1, ..., i∗WN+1+i1 = {d(0), h(0) : r1 · r2 · β · h(0) ≤
r1 · α · d(0) ≺ k(N) · (βα )i · β · h(0)
}
.
(15)
The optimum strategy u∗ = (u∗(0, (d, h)), ..., u∗(N + 1 +
i∗, (d, h))) in this case is found as follows: u∗(i, (d, h)) ={
0, for(d, h)R2+, α · d > r2 · β · h
}
, and is not provided oth-
erwise; i = 0, ..., i∗,
u∗(i(d, h)) = [1− (r2 · β · h)/(α · d)] , for(d, h)R2+, α ·
d > r2 · β · h, i ≥ i∗ + 1 and is not provided otherwise;
t = 1, ..., N + 1. As it was already noted, the defender
possesses limited financial resources. Let Q be the maximum
value of a resource. Then a set of the defenders preference at
such restriction W ∗1 will represent the intersection of the set
W1 and the set
{
(d(0), h(0)) : (d(0), h(0))R2+, d(0) ≤ Q
}
.
i.e. W ∗1 = W1 ∩
{
(d(0), h(0)) : (d(0), h(0))R2+, d(0) ≤ Q
}
A set of the hackers preference is to be found similarly. At
the same time, we assume that he possesses limited financial
resources. The task 2 is solved in the same way from the
point of view of the second allied player. It allows to provide
a positive orthant to the plane (d(0), h(0)) in the form of three
sets (cones with an apex at the point (0, 0) ). One set (cone)
adjoining an axis , is a set preferable to the defender. The
second set (cone) is a set preferable to the hacker. The third
set (cone) is a neutral set, from the point of view of both
players. Actually, this set characterizes the balance property
for the defender and the hacker. The players are dealing with
financing of protection and cracking respectively. That is the
players have the strategies for the statuses belonging to this
set, allowing them to continue as much long as possible the
CSS financings and CIST cracking. That means the conditions
d(t) ≥ 0, h(t) ≥ 0 will be satisfied for any timepoint . The
beams, being the borders of the cones, are set by the means
of coefficients. These coefficients represent a combination of
the parameters, setting the dynamics of CSS financing process
and CIST cracking. Therefore, if the initial values(d(0), h(0))
of the defender and hackers financial resources are set, it is
possible to vary, for instance, these parameters.
TABLE I
THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENT (SE) AT THE CHOICE OF
A STRATEGY FOR TRANSPORT CLOUD INFRASTRUCTURES BY THE
DEFENDER AND THE HACKER, FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF UKRAINE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
Number,
IE
Modeling results
The
financial
resource of
players is
not limited
Limitations
imposed on a financial
resource of players
1
(d(0), h(0))=
(10.0, 13.2);
(d(1),h(1))=
(12.0, 11.36);
(d(2),h(2))=
(14.0, 10.36);
(d(3),h(3))=
(16.0,8.4);
(d(4), h(4)) =
(18.0, 6.4).
Q=14
Limitation
for a
financial
resource
of the
defender
(d(0), h(0)) =
(7.0, 13.0);
(d(1), h(1))=
(8.0, 11.0);
(d(2),h(2)) =
(9.0, 10.0);
(d(3), h(3)) =
(10.0, 8.0);
(d(4),h(4)) =
(11.0, 6.0).
2
(d(0), h(0))=
(5.0, 10.0);
(d(1),h(1))=
(4.0, 12.0);
(d(2), h(2))=
(3.0, 13.0);
(d(3),h(3))=
(2.0, 15.0);
(d(4), h(4))=
(1.0, 17.0).
S=16
Limitation
for a
financial
resource
of the
hacker
(d(0),h(0))=
(5.0, 10.0);
(d(1), h(1))=
(4.0, 11.0);
(d(2),h(2))=
(3.0, 12.0);
(d(3), h(3))=
(2.0, 14.0);
(d(4),h(4))=
(1.0, 15.0).
3
(d(0), h(0))=
(5.0, 20.0);
(d(1),h(1))=
(4.0, 16.0);
(d(2), h(2))=
(3.0, 12.0);
(d(3),h(3)) =
(2.0, 8.0),
(d(4); h(4)) =
(1.0, 4.0).
Q=7
Limitation
for a
financial
resource
of the
defender
(d(0), h(0)) =
(5.0, 15.0);
(d(1),h(1)) =
(4.0, 12.0);
(d(2), h(2))=
(3.0, 9.0),
(d(3),h(3))=
(2.0, 6.0);
(d(4), h(4)) =
(1.0, 3.0).
V. RESULTS OF SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
The simulation experiments were executed in the earlier
described ”SSDMI” module [4, 6, 19, 21], and the control
computing experiments in the Mathcad packet. The simulation
experiment purposes: 1) determination of a set of players
strategies (a CIST (cloud infrastructure on transport) defender
and a hacker); 2) modeling of the risks parameters, connected
to the loss of players financial resources; 3) determination
of a set of players starting states and their strategies which
allow the CIST defender or the hacker to bring the system
upon one or another terminal surface. The results of simulation
experiments are shown in table I and in fig. 1-3.
The beam of balance is shown by a solid line with round
markers. Areas in fig. 1-3 are shown: 1) The CIST defenders
”preference” is below the beam; 2) The hackers ”preference” is
above the beam. The values of points, received during the sim-
ulation experiment, are presented in table I. The defender and
hackers movement trajectories are represented by dotted lines
with triangular markers. The trajectories are in the defender
and hackers preference area respectively. The solid line with
square markers shows the limitations imposed on the defender
and hackers financial resources. Financial limitations are not
obligatory. Since, if, for instance, cybertroops or intelligence
agencies act as the hacker, we assume that their financial
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resource is not limited, see table I. For the purpose of checking
Fig. 1. Results of simulation experiment 1. Trajectory of the CIST defender
movement.
Fig. 2. Results of simulation experiment 2. Trajectory of the hacker move-
ment.
Fig. 3. Results of simulation experiment 3. System ”stability”.
the adequacy of the carried-out calculations, approbation of the
results received by the means of ”SSDMI” is also executed
for real projects in the field of cyber security of transport
cloud infrastructures enterprises in Ukraine and Kazakhstan
[6, 19, 21]. In [19] the acceptable operational accuracy of
the ”SSDMI” programming module in the ratio with the
simulation experiments results is confirmed.
VI. DISCUSSION OF SIMULATION MODELING RESULTS
In fig. 1-3 the following cases are considered: a) in fig. 1 the
case, in which the player the CIST defender has advantages
in the amount of initial financial resources, is shown. That
is these resources are in a set of the defenders preference.
The defender, applying the optimum strategy, will achieve his
purpose, as he has enough financial resources, despite their
limitation at the initial timepoint. The defender’s purpose is to
bring the system status onto ”his” terminal surface. The set of
the beams proceeding from the point (0,0) is considered in a
positive orthant of the plane. These beams are set by the ratio:
h = (2.5−1/n) ·d.These beams set the first player preference
sets for n steps. For example, a set W ∗1 is the set:{
(d(0), h(0)) : (d(0), h(0))R2+, (2, 5− 1/(n− 1)) ≤
d(0) ≤ h(0) < (2.5− 1/n) · d(0)} . (16)
For example, if n = 1, then W ∗1 ={
(d(0), h(0)) : (d(0), h(0))R2+, 0 ≤ h(0) < (1.5) · d(0)
}
.
The beam: h(0) = (2.5) · d(0) is a balance beam (it is
shown by a solid line with round markers). Sets W ∗1 are
the sets of statuses of the players having the following
property. Property: if a game begins from W ∗1 ,the defender
in a single step will achieve the purpose in a single step with
probability (1/n) , if the defender and the hacker apply the
optimum mixed strategy. b) in fig. 2 the situation, in which
the hacker using non-optimal behavior of the defender and
the fact that starting states of the players are in the hackers
preference area, is shown. The hacker has sufficient financial
resources and, despite their limitation at the initial timepoint,
he ”brings” a system status onto ”his” terminal surface. In a
positive orthant of the plane the set of the beams proceeding
from the point (0,0) is considered. The beams are set by
a ratio: h = (2.5 + 1/n) · d. The beams set the hackers
preference sets for n steps. The beam h = 2 ·d(0) is a balance
beam. The sets W ∗1 are the sets of statuses of the players
having the following property. Property: if a game begins
from W ∗1 ,the defender will achieve the purpose in a single
step with probability (1/n) , if the defender and the hacker
apply the optimum mixed strategy.c) in fig. 3 the situation,
when the system starting state is on a balance beam, is shown.
The defender and the hacker, applying the optimum strategy,
”move” along the beam. It ”satisfies” both the defender, and
the hacker. While implementing the simulation experiment,
we show that our model and also its program implementation
in ”SSDMI”, are capable to provide the effective support of
decision-making in the field of CSS financing. This work
continues a number of our publications [4, 6, 7, 19] which
state the theoretical and methodological bases of DMSS
design, using a bilinear multistep quality game with several
terminal surfaces. The approach offered in work, allows
eliminating many components of uncertainty in the CSS
financial investments modeling processes, in particular, for
the CIST, influencing cyber security investments in different
parameters. That feature distinguishes our research from the
ones of other authors [15, 2225]. The drawback of the model,
revealed during the simulation experiment, is the fact that
the data retrieved at the choice of strategy of financing the
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means of cyber security of transport cloud infrastructures, did
not always match the actual data. The maximum deviation of
the simulation experiment results from practical data made
up 911Further development perspectives of this research is
transferring of the accumulated experience to real projects on
financing of cyber security means of cloud infrastructures,
in particular, on transport in Ukraine and the Republic of
Kazakhstan.
RESEARCH FINDINGS. In the article the following find-
ings are received. The model is developed for the intellectual-
ized decision-making support system in the course of financing
in cyber security means of transport cloudy infrastructures.
The offered model in its basis contains games theory tools. The
model is integrated into the intellectualized support system of
decision-making. The system allows the ultimate user to assess
risks in the course of cyber security means financing. The
scientific novelty of the model consists in the fact that unlike
the existing approaches, the decision of a bilinear multistep
quality game with several terminal surfaces is made. The
decision of a bilinear multistep game in the class of strict
strategy and also a one-step game in the class of the mixed
strategy, found with the help of domination methods, devel-
oped for infinite antagonistic games, allowed to assess the risks
for the players, who represent the parties of protection and
attack respectively, for cloud-based computing infrastructures
on transport. The results of the simulation experiment, during
which different ratios of the parameters describing the process
of financing in cyber security means of cloud-based computing
infrastructures on transport, were considered. At the same
time, for the party of protection, the financial strategy of
the hacker for the cases of limited and unlimited financial
resources, were analyzed. It is shown that the class of games,
considered in the article, allows to adequately describe the
process and to find the optimum financial strategy of the
protection party. The decision, made theoretically and con-
firmed during the simulation experiment, assumes accounting
financial components of protection strategy at any ratios of
the parameters describing financing process. On the basis of
the findings received due to the developed intellectualized
decision-making support system, the conclusion about the
risks of financial resources loss by the players for cyber
protection and cracking of transport cloud-based computing
infrastructures respectively, is drawn.
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